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FOREWORD: TELLING STORIES 
Kim Lane Scheppele* 
Why is there such a rush to storytelling? Why has narrative be-
come such an important and recurring theme in legal scholarship 
these days?1 
Perhaps it is the post-Kuhnian pragmatism about truth that has 
spread from the history of science throughout the academy.2 If sci-
ence has what appears to be fads and fashions, then can other knowl-
edge be more certain? Or perhaps it is a response to "argument by 
anecdata"3 that Ronald Reagan made so popular, countering numbing 
statistics showing that all was not right with the happy stories of indi-
viduals who didn't fit the patterns. Or perhaps it's that law has always 
been concerned with narratives, with the individual plaintiff and the 
individual defendant in the individual case, so that theoretical atten-
tion to narrative was bound to emerge eventually. 
The concern for narrative that the present issue reveals has a more 
easily identifiable origin, though the other forces probably matter too. 
The last twenty years or so have seen a great opening of the legal pro-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, and Assistant 
Research Scientist in the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan. A.B. 1975, 
Barnard College; M.A. (Sociology) 1977, Ph.D. (Sociology) 1985, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
I would like to thank Eric Rabkin for inspiring the format of the conference on legal narrative 
and Kevin Kennedy and the other Review editors for working so hard to make sure it happened. 
I would also like to thank Greg Heller, Don Herzog, Rick Pildes, and especially Peter Seidman 
for providing comments, criticisms, and common sense on short notice. 
1. In addition to this special issue of the Michigan Law Review, there have been other sympo-
sia on the Jaw-and-literature theme recently. See, e.g., Symposium: Law and Literature, 39 
MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982); 
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE (S. Levinson & s. Mailloux eds. 1988). In addition, a 
rash of recent individual articles has appeared on law review pages. See, e.g., in a much larger 
literature, L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and 
Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 81 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1988); West, Jurispru-
dence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 
(1985); see also D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-
TICE (1987); K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIC-
TIMS (1988). The work of the founders of the law-and-literature movement, in which the legal 
narrative theme sounds prominently, is an almost mandatory citation in articles with this per-
spective. See J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW (1985); J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE 
THEIR MEANING (1984); Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 179 (1985); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative]; Cover, Violence and the 
Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986), for some of the inspiration that drives the movement. 
2. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
3. I owe the phrase to Don Herzog who has used it in conversation. 
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fession to those who were formerly outsiders. The legal community, 
once comprised almost entirely of white men, has, however partially, 
hesitantly and reluctantly, begun to admit women, people of color, 
and those with life experiences far different than those of the lawyers 
whose ranks they now join. As the world of law schools, legal prac-
tice, and legal teaching has become more diverse, it should not be sur-
prising that legal scholarship is showing signs of diversity as well. The 
conference on legal narrative that gave rise to this volume is one prod-
uct of that diversity. And though narrative is not uniquely the prov-
ince of those who seek to challenge established ways of thinking in 
law, many of the authors in this volume use stories to highlight and 
celebrate diversity. 
The hefty issue that you now have in your hands has, despite its 
bulk, a sort of urgency about it, an urgency that comes from the fact 
that so many of these Articles draw from deep experience. The Arti-
cles contained here speak with many voices and draw on many pow-
ers. Some are not like law review articles you have ever seen before; 
others may look more traditional, but they carry unconventional 
messages. Some experiment with format, with subject matter, with the 
boundaries of legal discourse. Some speak to the heart more than to 
the head. Some want to provoke, to unsettle, to challenge "the way we 
do things around here." Almost all want to challenge the "we." 
These Articles break taboos. The Articles by Patricia Williams 
and Clark Cunningham speak with the power of "I." They will en-
gage you in a conversation with this named author, this real person, 
whose struggles and thoughts are revealed in the words on the page. 
And they use this power of "I" to make larger points about social 
arrangements, about conventional wisdom and its unwiseness, about 
how things might be. Other Articles, those by Richard Delgado and 
Derrick Bell, tell stories that are not true, though readers will recog-
nize the realness in them. They ask readers to imagine, and in imagin-
ing to experience, the worlds created in the words, to save the pain of 
having to live them. Still other Articles, those by Mari Matsuda, 
David Luban, and Milner Ball, report the official court-approved ver-
sions of stories, and then reveal the unofficial versions, available to but 
rejected by courts. They show in the telling of alternative stories how 
selective narratives come to have the power of truth, though there may 
be other versions that lead to other conclusions, other ways of seeing. 
The Article by Joseph Singer engages the practice of teaching, and 
shows how stories can be used to enlist empathy and understanding 
from students whose own experiences do not ordinarily lead them to 
challenge the official views. There are also Articles that challenge the 
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premises of the rest of the issue, reminding all that in the proliferation 
of stories, it matters how one chooses among them, and that one needs 
criteria other than narrative force to do that. Toni Massaro and 
Steven Winter argue that narrative alone, for all its power, is not 
enough. 
This issue testifies to the attractiveness of, and limits to, story-
telling as a force in law. But whose stories are told? Who listens? 
And who responds? This symposium explores these questions, chal-
lenging traditional practices and exploring new ones in the telling of 
stories in the law. One important lesson that can be learned from this 
issue is that narrative is a way of organizing, coping with, even acting 
on the world. Stories carry power because they have the ability to 
convey truths even if the stories themselves are not the only ways of 
seeing the world. Stories re-present experience, and can introduce im-
agination and new points of view. 
To make sense of law and to organize experience, people often tell 
stories. And these stories are telling. 
I. THE STORY OF TFllS SYMPOSIUM 
Once upon a time, 4 Richard Delgado sent a letter to the major law 
reviews suggesting a symposium on legal narrative. 
We believe that stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are potent 
devices for analyzing mindset and ideology - the bundle of presupposi-
tions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a back-
ground of which legal discourse takes place. . . . [T]he main cause of 
Black and brown subordination is not so much poorly crafted or en-
forced laws or judicial decisions. Rather, it is the prevailing mindset 
through which members of the majority race justify the world as it is, 
that is with whites on top and Blacks at the bottom. Ideology makes 
current social arrangements seem natural and fair. 5 
Along with this dire diagnosis, Delgado proposed a remedy. "The 
cure is storytelling," he announced, "counterhegemonic" storytelling 
to "quicken and engage conscience."6 
Kevin Kennedy, the editor-in-chief of the Michigan Law Review, 
and Lee Bollinger, dean of the University of Michigan Law School, 
discussed the idea and agreed that the Review would devote a special 
issue to questions of legal narrative and its "counterhegemonic" 
power. Calls went out to potential storytellers; enthusiastic responses 
encouraged the Review's editors to proceed. And with all the speed of 
4. June 1, 1988, to be precise. 
5. Letter from Richard Delgado to Kevin Kennedy (June 1, 1988). 
6. Id. at 2. 
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a group that bas only one year to make a difference, Review editors 
solicited manuscripts, selected a set, and invited the participants to 
come to Michigan's campus in April, only ten months after Delgado's 
original letter was sent. 
But how to run a conference on a topic and with a method 
designed to challenge ordinary ways of doing things? The business-as-
usual format with serial speakers presenting prepackaged papers was 
not going to match the radical ambitions of the conference organizers 
or the writers. The emphasis on different points of view called for a 
format that encouraged interaction and dialogue among participants. 
Kevin Kennedy asked me to help, because I teach a course on legal 
narrative and the legal construction of facts at the University of Mich-
igan Law School. I asked Eric Rabkin, a professor of English at Mich-
igan and an extraordinary teacher of writing, literature, and literary 
theory, to suggest a format. Rabkin proposed having the writers, Re-
view editors, and others who wanted to participate in the conference 
meet in small editing groups to read, discuss, and provide feedback on 
the papers. 7 All the conveners would meet together at the beginning 
and the end, first to agree on some collective ambitions for the issue 
and later to discuss bow each paper grew and dovetailed with the 
others after all the structured dialogue, in multiple editing groups with 
different casts of characters, over two days of meetings. 
At first the Review editors, and later the participants, were skepti-
cal. And the logistical problems raised by trying to match in small 
groups sets of people who bad bad a chance to read closely particular 
papers in advance were staggering. But in the end, with constant ad-
justments in the original plan being made as objections were being 
constantly raised, the conference proceeded in small group discussion 
sessions, 8 punctuated by trips to local restaurants and breaks for bits 
7. Eric Rabkin and his colleague Macklin Smith have been experimenting with different for-
mats for helping people to meet together to discuss work in progress and to assist each other in 
the process of writing. The format we adopted for this conference is adapted from these meth-
ods, which are more fully discussed in E. RABKIN & M. SMITH, TEACHING WRITING THAT 
WORKS (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
8. The small groups in which the discussions took place had a complicated structure. Each 
participant, whether author, Review staffer, or general participant (and a number of Michigan 
Law School faculty participated) was assigned to an editing group of three or four members, each 
of which had one author in it. First, each editing group met to discuss and write comments on 
the paper of an author who was not present in that group but who was present at the conference. 
This allowed each group to consider a paper the way readers of this issue actually would: as an 
interested audience who did not have the author immediately present to ask for clarifications or 
elaborations. Later, informal conversation between these editing groups and the authors whose 
papers were discussed in this way gave each writer oral feedback in addition to the written feed-
back. The original editing groups then met again, this time to discuss the paper of the author 
who was a member of that group. By this time, each group had had a chance to build solidarity 
and had had experience discussing a paper already. And this group also had as part of the 
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of sleep and exercise. 
It would be a wild exaggeration to claim there was agreement at 
the end about just how to think about the role of narrative in legal 
discourse. If anything, differences among some of the conference par-
ticipants were sharpened by the time everyone met in a large group at 
the end of the conference. Some worried about the coercive power of 
stories; others claimed that stories were noncoercive. Some insisted on 
the importance of theory; others wanted to undermine the prestige of 
theory. Some changed their minds, and their drafts, as a result of 
hearing others' stories and insights; others found their drafts weather-
ing the discussion with no need for repair. And so on. 
But what almost all the writers shared was a concern with the 
point of view of outsiders, those whose perspectives had been excluded 
in the law's construction of an official story for the particular case. 
Almost all agreed on the value of polyphony, and the conference gen-
erated a great deal of it. 
II. THE "CONSTITUTIVE WE" AND THE VOICES OF OUTSIDERS 
Much of legal scholarship these days is written in consensual terms 
to an audience it constitutes as "we." In the first sentences of the 
preface of Law's Empire, for example, Ronald Dworkin writes: "We 
live in and by the law. It makes us what we are .... We are subjects 
of law's empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals, bound in spirit 
while we debate what we must therefore do."9 And Robert Cover be-
gins Nomos and Narrative with: "We inhabit a nomos - a normative 
universe. We constantly create and maintain a world of right and 
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void." 10 
And lest you think this is just a rhetorical device used by those, 
like Dworkin and Cover, who are looking for a coherent set of values 
in the law in which "we" can believe, those who find that the law is 
fraught with contradiction are not free from "we" either. To take a 
couple of examples from the Critical Legal Studies literature, here is 
the first sentence of an article by Peter Gabel: "Legal reasoning is an 
material they could consider the comments of the group that had discussed that author's paper 
first. Each author, now in a group whose participants he or she knew fairly well already, was 
then able to discuss his or her own paper and the comments it had generated from other partici-
pants. Because this format meant that the authors didn't have an opportunity to discuss their 
papers directly with each other (since each was in a different editing group), there was an addi-
tional session in which the authors met together to talk about the overlapping subject matter and 
the structure of individual papers. After nearly two days of focused discussion of these papers in 
small groups, everyone met to talk about the papers, the topic, and the issue. 
9. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE vii (1986). 
10. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note l, at 4. 
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inherently repressive form of interpretive thought which limits our 
comprehension of the social world and its possibilities."11 And an ex-
cerpt from the opening paragraph of an article by Frances Olsen: 
"Our historical experience with censorship warns us to be wary of 
state protection; our experience with domestic violence warns us to be 
wary of privacy."12 
Now these may be somewhat different "we"s and "our"s and 
"us"s in the different excerpts, 13 but they reveal something quite strik-
ing about contemporary legal scholarship.14 Contests over the mean-
ing, the reach, or the significance of law these days are often framed as 
debates between "we" and an invisible but ever-present "they." 
"They" are the outsiders, the ones who do not believe, who are not 
included, who do not understand, who are beyond the boundaries of 
community. Wherever there is a "constitutive we," there is also an 
excluded "they." 
This is, of course, nothing new. The use of the "constitutive we" 
in the American legal tradition is prominent in the founding docu-
ments of American government, law and nationhood. "We hold these 
truths to be self-evident," begins the Declaration of Independence. 15 
"We the People," begins the Constitution. 16 These were texts of revo-
lutionary times, when the assertion of a "we" was first an act of defi-
ance, and then an act of construction. Constituting a "we" was an 
essential part of separating "us" from a firmly excluded and rejected 
"them." 
"We" talk does not just appear at founding moments, when the 
construction of a new community is urgent, however. "We" talk is a 
persistent feature of legal discourse, even once a legal system is up and 
11. Gabel, Reijication in Legal Reasoning, in MARXISM AND LAW 262 (P. Beirne & R. Quin-
ney eds. 1982) (emphasis added). 
12. Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387, 
387-88 (1984) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
13. I am not meaning to include here the uses of "we" to include the writer and readers in a 
common journey through a text. References like "we can see in this argument that ••. " and "in 
the next section of this article, we will find that ... " seem to me to be doing something else. 
They are joining writer and reader in a temporary alliance in the joint project of getting through 
a text. They are not examples of the "constitutive we," creating an alliance of fate or of belief or 
of community that goes beyond the text, as the Dworkin, Cover, Gabel, and Olsen examples do. 
Nor does the use of "we" to indicate a collective author constitute a "constitutive we." The 
Supreme Court often uses "we" this way, but the reference is clearly to an institution of multiple 
individuals, not some group created by the use of "we." 
14. Of course, some of those writing in jurisprudence do explicitly recognize the assumptions 
which are masked by the "constitutive we." See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318 (1988) ("an ever-changing 'us'"). 
15. The Declaration oflndependence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
16. U.S. CONST. preamble. 
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running. 17 There are several reasons why this may be so. One is that 
in some versions of a liberal political regime, the government relies for 
its legitimacy on the consent of those who are to be subject to its laws. 
And it matters, then, who is included among the consenters for it is 
only against consenters that the laws may be legitimately enforced. 
"We" are those who consent; "they" are outside the reach of "our" 
laws. 18 Another reason for the persistence of "we" talk in law may 
have to do with the relative insularity of the legal profession. Those 
who are trained in law learn to speak a specialized language. When 
talking about the law with others who are similarly trained, lawyers 
become the "we" who know the laws, excluding the "they" who do 
not. 19 And the adversarial nature of legal practice in common-law 
legal systems also encourages a "we-they" attitude to emerge. "We" 
are the forces of justice in the world who are on the right side of this 
case; "they" are the opponents who want to thwart "us" at every turn. 
Legal discourse is in an important way, then, dependent on a variety 
of "we-they" subdiscourses for its internal structure. 
But there is another important "we-they" structure in legal dis-
course, one that this issue of the Michigan Law Review has as its 
theme. It is the implicit contrast between those whose self-believed20 
stories are officially approved, accepted, transformed into fact, and 
those whose self-believed stories are officially distrusted, rejected, 
found to be untrue, or perhaps not heard at all.21 Those whose stories 
are believed have the power to create fact; those whose stories are not 
believed live in a legally sanctioned "reality" that does not match their 
perceptions. "We," the insiders, are those whose versions count as 
facts; "they," the outsiders, are those whose versions are discredited 
17. Karl Llewellyn was well aware of this tendency when he wrote: 
Nowhere more than in law do you need armor against ... ethnocentric and chronocentric 
snobbery - the smugness of your own tribe and your own time: We are the Greeks; all 
others are barbarians .... Law, as against other disciplines is like a tree. In its own soil it 
roots, and shades one spot alone. 
K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 44 (1960). 
18. A more complete discussion of the relation between consent, legitimacy of a regime of 
laws, and obligation to obey the laws can be found in K.L. Scheppele & J. Waldron, Con-
tractarian Methods in Political and Legal Evaluation (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
19. For one example of what happens when these two discourses collide, see Sarat & Fel-
stiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SocY. REV. 93 (1986). 
20. The term is Erving Goffman's. Lies are "self-disbelieved" statements, since what makes 
a statement a lie is not only whether the statement is false, but also whether the teller believes it to 
be false. E. GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION 7 (1969). Similarly, then, a self-believed story 
is one that the teller takes to be true. 
21. This "we-they" structure is not wholly independent of the other "we-they" structures 
described above. Those whose self-believed stories find their way into law may well be those who 
are more plausibly represented as having consented to a legal regime and who are able to express 
their stories in language more amenable to legal argument. 
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and disbelieved. This can happen on an individual level, where spe-
cific persons find their truths not to be inevitable, or on a collective 
level, where whole groups of persons find their truths to be dismissed. 
In either instance, fundamental issues of legitimacy are raised. 
How are people to think about the law when their stories, the ones 
they have lived and believed, are rejected by courts, only to be re-
placed by other versions with different legal results? The legal theorist 
may be able to fall back on a consent story, to say that these people did 
or plausibly could have committed themselves to·the process in which 
the facts were found and judgments given, even if they find themselves 
in disagreement over the particular findings of fact in a particular case. 
But there are few things more disempowering in law than having one's 
own self-believed story rejected, when rules of law (however fair in the 
abstract) are applied to facts that are not one's own, when legal judg-
ments proceed from a description of one's own world that one does 
not recognize. 
The resolution of any individual case in the law relies heavily on a 
court's adoption of a particular story,22 one that makes sense, is true 
to what the listeners know about the world, and hangs together.23 But 
some liberal models of legal legitimacy rely solely on consent to ab-
stract laws, or perhaps even consent to the basic structure of a legal 
system or a government, to justify the application of the laws in partic-
ular instances.24 These models oflegitimacy do not require that some-
how people's particular points of view are taken into account at all, 
either because justice isn't thought to operate at a level that specific,25 
or because the situation in which consent is initially given does not 
generally include enough information for someone to have a point of 
view different from that of others26 or because the specific points of 
22. See K.L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY JN THE COMMON 
LAW 86-108 (1988), for an argument that interpretation of law and interpretation of fact are not 
separate processes, but instead accomplished together in the process of justifying a decision. 
23. See L. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY JN THE COURTROOM 
(1981) for a description of what makes stories persuasive at trial. 
24. For Locke, for example, consent was given to the form of a government rather than to 
the specific application of laws. See J. LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREA• 
TJSES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698). And consent for John Rawls 
means agreement on the basic institutions of a society, and nothing nearly as specific as individ· 
ual Jaws, let alone particular facts or particular points of view. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (1971). 
25. Most efforts at understanding legal legitimacy operate at the level of the whole system 
and are reluctant even to claim that something so specific as that an individual law should be just 
for consent to be inferred. See J. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 350-55. 
26. One effect of Rawls' "veil of ignorance," id. at 136-42, is that people do not have enough 
information to be able to develop different points of view, not just about preferences and self· 
interest, but perhaps even more importantly, about how to see the social world around them in 
the first place. This is not a necessary feature of contractarian thought, however. It is possible 
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view people bring with them into concrete cases are too full of self-
interest to provide a compelling normative account of how the case 
should be resolved. 27 A considerably abstracted consent is enough. 
But consent to basic structures or abstract legal rules is not enough to 
ensure the experience of justice on the ground in concrete cases. · 
The experience of justice is intimately connected with one's percep-
tions of "fact," just as it is connected with one's beliefs and values. 
Beliefs and values do not exist in a world of pure abstraction, but 
rather always operate with and on specific assumptions about and per-
ceptions of the state of the world. A judgment that murder is wrong, 
for example, already comes with the presupposition that some sorts of 
very specific factual occurrences count as murder and others do not. 
(And it also comes with a view that some cases are problematic for the 
classification scheme, existing as they do at the blurry boundaries of 
the concept of murder.) People might agree in the abstract that there 
should be legal rules condemning and punishing murder, but if a wo-
man killing her husband counts as a murderer while a man killing his 
wife in otherwise identical circumstances does not, then some, at least, 
are apt to feel their sense of justice has been violated. And it is not 
because those whose sense of justice has been violated and those who 
think the judgment is fair disagree about abstract rules or basic struc-
tures that provide for the condemnation of murder. They disagree, at 
a minimum, about what features of the world are to be considered 
relevant to a particular description and how observations and evi-
dence, themselves already and inevitably conceptualized, are to be fur-
ther mapped into specialized descriptive categories. 28 They may also 
disagree about what is to count as evidence, about the accuracy of 
particular bits of information or about the correctness of taking cer-
for a model of consent to have much more sociological fidelity and still be fully contractarian. 
For a case to this effect, see K.L. Scheppele & J. Waldron, supra note 18. 
27. Contractarianism often captures the problem of conflicting accounts by asking people to 
see a situation from another person's point of view. As with the Golden Rule, we are asked to 
imagine what it would feel like to be in another person's position. But this is meant to capture an 
impersonal (or interpersonal) view of the situation, not a richly variegated sense of the ways in 
which different people may see things differently from different social vantage points. "From this 
interpersonal standpoint, a certain amount of how things look from another person's point of 
view, like a certain amount of how they look from my own, will be counted as bias." Scanlon, 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 117 (A. Sen & B. Wil-
liams eds. 1982). 
28. Judgments of relevance and problems of mapping are not usually idiosyncratic judg-
ments, independent of rules. The injunction to "decide like cases alike" is itself a rule that may 
be represented as the product of prior consent. But just what counts as "alike" for the purposes 
of particular cases is often very much a local judgment that cannot be well captured in rules at 
the level of generality at which consent judgments are usually implied in liberal political thought. 
See C. GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LoCAL KNOWL-
EDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1983). 
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tain points into account in the description. But the most troublesome 
problem for an account of the legitimacy of law involves the some-
times irreconcilable differences among people in their widely varying 
accounts of the same event. 
Social theorists have long known that people differently situated in 
the social world come to see events in quite distinct and distinctive 
ways.29 How people interpret what they see (or what people see in the 
first place) depends to a very large extent on prior experiences, on the 
ways in which people have organized their own sense-making and ob-
servation, on the patterns that have emerged in the past for them as 
meaningful in living daily life. And so it should not be surprising that 
people with systematically different sorts of experiences should come 
to see the world in systematically different ways. The varying descrip-
tions composed by people with varied experiences reveal that "percep-
tual fault lines"30 run through apparently stable communities that 
appear to have agreed on basic institutions and structures and on gen-
eral governing rules. Consent comes apart in battles of description.31 
Consent comes apart over whose stories to tell. And legal earthquakes 
are always just about to happen when there are serious perceptual 
fault lines that run through the legal construction of facts. 
Stories may diverge, then, not because one is true and another 
false, but rather because they are both self-believed descriptions com-
ing from different points of view informed by different background as-
sumptions about how to make sense of events. In law, the adoption of 
some stories rather than others, the acceptance of some accounts as 
fact and others as falsehood, cannot ever be the result of matching 
evidence against the real world to figure out which story is true. De-
spite the popularity of correspondence theories of language, 32 courts 
cannot do what would be necessary to determine whether words corre-
sponded to things and hence were being used properly. In law, both at 
trial and on appeal, all courts have is stories. Judges and jurors are 
not witnesses to the events at issue; they are witnesses to stories about 
29. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
(1966); K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936); A. SCHUTZ & T. LUCKMANN, THE 
STRUCTURES OF THE LIFE-WORLD (1973). 
30. For a more complete discussion of "perceptual fault lines," see Scheppele, The Re-vision 
of Rape Law, 54 u. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1108-13 (1987). 
31. For one particularly striking example of this, notice the battle between pro-choice and 
pro-life forces on abortion over whether to use "fetus" or "the unborn child" to describe some-
thing that or someone who has no neutral name - nor even an uncontested pronoun. 
32. For a first-rate introduction to problems and puzzles in the philosophy of language, see S. 
BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD: GROUNDINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
(1984). 
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the events. 33 And when litigants come to court with different stories, 
some are accepted and become "the facts of the case" and others are 
rejected and cast aside. Some of what is cast aside ,may indeed be false 
(and some of what is accepted may be too). But some of the J;"ejected 
stories may be accurate versions of events that grow from experiences 
different from the experiences of those who are doing the choosing. 
This issue on legal narrative provides evidence of the presence and 
persistence of perceptual fault lines in contemporary American legal 
culture. Milner Ball traces the dominant story of origin of the Ameri-
can republic, and shows how the versions of American Indians present 
a very different picture. Patricia Williams reveals in a moving per-
sonal account what the experience of harm from racial discrimination 
feels like, although courts say no harm is done. Mari Matsuda 
presents compelling evidence that racist hate speech does have strong 
effects on those to whom it is directed, that it is patterned and organ-
ized, that it is not in experience what courts have said it is in theory. 
David Luban contrasts two quite different accounts of the demonstra-
tions for racial equality held in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963. Jo-
seph Singer uses imaginative hypotheticals in teaching to get students 
who have never had the experience to imagine what it is like to be 
workers thrown out of jobs by a plant closing. Clark Cunningham 
wonders whether legal discourse is so different from ordinary dis-
course that a lawyer cannot really "represent" a client's views in legal 
language at all. Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado create fictional 
events to provide vivid accounts of racial discrimination, to pierce the 
self-justification that those in the "we" engage in to explain their ac-
tions, and to construct visions that might supplant usual ways of 
thinking. 
All of these Articles attest to the very real presence of perceptual 
fault lines, different descriptions of events that grow from different ex-
periences and different resonances. And most of these perceptual fault 
lines described in these Articles occur at the boundaries between social 
groups, between whites and people of color, between the privileged 
and the poor, between men and women, between lawyers and 
nonlawyers. And the Articles also make clear that the "we" con-
structed in legal accounts has a distinctive selectivity, one that tends to 
33. Jerome Frank noticed this, and realized that, in legal storytelling, "[s]ince the actual facts 
of a case do not walk into court, but happened outside the court-room, and always in the past, 
the task of the trial court is to reconstruct the past from what are at best second-hand reports of 
the facts." J. FRANK, Modern Legal Magic, in COURTS ON TRIAL 37 (1949). Frank also noticed 
that since jurors and judges are witnesses to stories, they themselves introduce another layer of 
interpretation of the facts. The facts are, in this process, "twice refracted." J. FRANK, Facts Are 
Guesses, in COURTS ON TRIAL 22 (1949). 
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adopt the stories of those who are white and privileged and male and 
lawyers, while casting aside the stories and experiences of people of 
color, of the poor, of women, of those who cannot describe their exper-
iences in the language of the law. "They" are the outsiders, and this 
volume engages in what Mari Matsuda calls "outsider jurispru-
dence, "34 telling the stories that are omitted from mainstream legal 
discourse. 
The papers in this volume show that the stories of outsiders are 
systematically ignored. Bpt why are certain perspectives excluded 
from legal narrative? In asking this question, I share some of the theo-
retical concerns expressed in the Articles by Steven Winter and Toni 
Massaro. Winter shows how narrative provides a compelling way to 
make sense of the world because it invariably draws on concepts and 
categories with which people have first-hand experience. Massaro 
asks how judges should choose among competing stories when the sto-
ries diverge and empathy gives us uncertain guidance. Both Winter 
and Massaro examine the mechanisms that lead some stories to seem 
more compelling and to be chosen over others. 
In the next Part, I will explore some of the other mechanisms that 
tend to exclude "outsiders' stories." One obvious answer suggests it-
self. Given that the perceptual fault lines occur at the boundaries be-
tween groups where there is much social tension these days, excluding 
outsiders' stories may be a direct act of racism, of sexism, of intoler-
ance of difference. It may be an overt act of power, a response by 
those in control to keep those without power in their place. But many 
of the practices that put people of color and other outsiders at a disad-
vantage are more subtle, harder to see, and harder still to correct. 
The exclusions of outsiders' views happens not only in explicit acts 
of hostility and rejection, but also implicitly in the details of legal prac-
tice, at the places where abstract rules are applied to concrete cases 
and at the places where courts invoke apparently neutral procedures. 
And it is at places where the perceptual fault lines shift and buckle, 
revealing the multiplicity of voices that the law generally quiets, that 
legal institutions reveal the strain under which they operate and the 
ordinary legal habits that guide legal practice. As I will try to show in 
the next Part, outsiders' stories are often excluded by the daily opera-
tion of apparently harmless legal habits. 
34. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim '.s Story, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 2320, 2323-26 (1989). . 
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Ill. LEGAL HABITS 
Storytelling can be se.en as a deeply patterned activity. English 
speakers know when they hear "once upon a time" that a story is 
about to begin. "And they lived happily ever after" is clearly an end-
ing. Vladlmir Propp has demonstrated that a whole tradition of Rus-
sian folktales followed a relatively simple, predictable structure. 35 
And literary structuralists of all sorts demonstrate over and over again 
how, despite the enormous superficial variation in the content, style, 
and tone of stories, deep structures reappear.36 
Legal storytelling is no less patterned than other sorts of story-
telling; indeed, it may be even more structured because .it is embedded 
in a larger institutional framework that routiniz~ solutions to unusual 
events and that values regularity and predictability. But unlike rules 
of law, which are explicitly taught and tested in law schools, the craft 
of legal storytelling is generally left to the practitioner to learn and 
develop without formal and systematic training. And though this 
craft is constrained by rules of evidence and the demands of legal rele-
vance, there are few formal legal rules providing guidance on how the 
lawyer or judge should structure stories. 37 
Yet, it matters a great deal how stories are framed. The same 
· event can be described in multiple ways, each true in the sense that it 
genuinely describes the experience of the storyteller, but each version 
may be differently organized and give a very different impression of 
"what happened." And different legal consequences can follow from 
the choice of one story rather than another. 
Narratives may differ because they take a different cut through 
events, beginning and ending at a different place or taking a different 
point of view throughout. But they may also be different because the 
elements which go to make up the narrative are framed differently in 
the first place. While some important legal consequences flow from 
how the narrative is structured overall, other important legal conse-
quences are attendant upon the choice among alternative descriptions 
35. V. PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE (1968). 
36. See, e.g., s. CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE (1978); E. RABKIN, NARRATIVE SUS-
PENSE (1970); R. SCHOLES, STRUCTURALISM IN LITERATURE (1974); Winter, The Cognitive 
Dimension of the AgonBetween Legal Power and Legal Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989). 
37. One such formal standard is the "clearly erroneous" rule, which provides a way for ap-
pellate courts to overturn the judgments of lower courts when lower courts have reached a 
clearly erroneous conclusion about specific facts. But a thoughtful and detailed study of the uses 
of the clearly erroneous rule shows that it is not one standard but many, giving appellate courts 
substantial flexibility in reviewing lower courts' findings of fact and not providing explicit gui-
dance in a rigorous way. See Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Re-
sources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645 (1988). 
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for discrete elements of the story. I will examine discrete descriptions 
first and whole narratives in the sections to follow. 
Let's start by taking one example where two different terms are 
applied to the same event: A 1977 Maryland rape attack involved a 
woman, identified only as Pat, who gave a ride home to Eddie Rusk, a 
man she met at a singles bar. Pat claimed that Rusk "lightly choked" 
her. This action, however, could have also been a "heavy caress."38 
Both descriptions might be given to the same physical movements of 
the defendant in placing his hands at the woman's neck, but the de-
scription of "choking" leads far more easily to the conclusion that the 
woman was raped than does the description that she was being 
"caressed." Neither version is evidently false, and yet the two compet-
ing descriptions lead judgment in different directions. In the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, Chief Justice Murphy's opinion upholding the 
conviction quoted the woman's words that the defendant "started 
lightly to choke me"39 and found that the jury could reasonably have 
believed her version "with particular focus upon the actual force ap-
plied by Rusk to Pat's neck."40 In the dissent in that court, Justice 
Cole wrote, "there is no suggestion by her that he bruised or hurt her 
in any manner, or that the 'choking' was intended to be disabling."41 
But heavy caressing, light choking, actual force applied, or "choking" 
(which put in quotes like this is probably meant to be read as "so-
called choking") could describe the same event, seen from different 
points of view. 
Or take another situation where the witnesses produced different 
accounts: In 1958 in North Carolina, a black man confessed to raping 
and murdering a white woman. The defendant, Elmer Davis, said that 
he had been interrogated "most all the time during the day and most 
all the time during the night" during the sixteen days he was held by 
the police before he confessed. 42 The detective captain denied that 
there was around-the-clock interrogation because there were no detec-
38. Judge Thompson's intermediate appellate opinion in Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 
A.2d 624, 628 (1979) stated, "At oral argument it was brought out that the 'lightly choking' 
could have been a heavy caress." See also the discussion of this case in S. EsTRICH, REAL RAPE 
63-66 (1987), and Scheppele, supra note 30, at 1105. 
39. State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 235, 242 A.2d 720, 722 (1981). 
40. 289 Md. at 246, 424 A.2d at 728. 
41. 289 Md. at 258, 424 A.2d at 734 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
42. This case appeared in the Supreme Court as Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 
(1966). The record in the case included a transcript of an evidentiary hearing held by the federal 
district court to determine the voluntariness of Davis' confession on a habeas petition. Davis' 
testimony about the extent of his questioning appeared in the record as Transcript of Hearing 
upon Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 238, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (No. 65-815) 
(hereinafter::lfabeas Transcript]. 
August 1989] Telling Stories 2087 
tives working on the 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. shift and so Davis 
couldn't possibly have been questioned all night.43 All three of the 
detectives assigned to the Davis case during the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift, 
however, testified that they might have asked Davis questions after 
dark. 44 These conflicting descriptions about the extent of the ques-
tioning might lead one to believe that someone was lying. Perhaps the 
detectives were coming back after the evening shift to interrogate Da-
vis all night and were lying about it at trial. Perhaps Davis was exag-
gerating the extent of the questioning to make it seem that the police 
were unduly pressuring him. But perhaps both descriptions referred 
to the same physical occurrences. Davis, who was sitting in jail for 
sixteen days and who, in all probability, was not wearing a watch, 45 
could have easily thought that he was being interrogated around the 
clock because the detectives asked him questions when it was light and 
when it was dark. Davis could have had a difficult time telling exactly 
when he was being questioned and, with nothing other than the alter-
nation of light and dark and the twice-daily appearance of food to 
mark out his days, Davis could understandably have felt that the inter-
rogation went on at all hours of the day and night. The detectives, 
being quite aware of the actual clock time when Davis was interro-
gated during each twenty-four hour period, could have understanda-
bly concluded that Davis was not questioned all day and all night. 
And the two descriptions might lead to very different legal conse-
quences. If Davis were interrogated day and night, the court might 
conclude that his original confession was coerced. But if Davis were 
found to have been questioned only at regular hours, the case for a 
coercive effect would be less compelling. Just such differences in de-
scriptions of "what happened" were central to the Court's judgments 
in the case. Chief Justice Warren's opinion overturning Davis' convic-
tion describes Davis as having been "interrogated repeatedly," which 
was taken as evidence that the police were overbearing.46 Justice 
Clark's dissent, arguing that the conviction and death sentence should 
43. Testimony of Detective Captain W.W. McCall, Habeas Transcript, supra note 42, at 354. 
44. Testimony of Detective Gardner, id. at 329; Testimony of Detective Holmberg, id. at 
343; Testimony of Detective Porter, id. at 346. 
45. Davis had escaped from prison just before he allegedly raped and murdered Mrs. Foy 
Bell Cooper. The statement of facts in the North Carolina Supreme Court provides much detail 
about Davis' attire at the time of his arrest, commenting on his "reddish brown shoes and dark 
clothing," on the shoe box he was carrying and on the billfold found in his possession which 
belonged to someone else. There is no mention of a watch, which he would have had to have 
acquired following his escape from prison, and which would undoubtedly have been noticed by 
the police. See State v. Davis, 253 N.C. 86, 90, 116 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1960). 
46. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739 (1966). 
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be upheld, referred to "sporadic interrogation,"47 which was not 
thought to be that coercive. Repeated and sporadic interrogation may 
have described the same events, seen from different points of view, but 
they had quite different legal force. 
Given how closely the legal results follow on the adoption of one 
description rather than another when both are arguably accounts of 
the same physical event, it matters a great deal how descriptions are 
framed in legal arguments in the first place, and how single descrip-
tions are selected as "what happened." But despite the enormous 
literature on how judges and lawyers interpret the law, much less at-
tention has been paid in the jurisprudential literature to how judges 
and lawyers interpret facts. And the construction and selection of de-
scriptions of events in the social world is not just the process of gather-
ing up facts the way one might gather up stones on a beach. The 
process of making a bit of information, an insight, or a description of 
experience into a "fact" is itself an important part of what it means to 
engage in the practice of lawyering or judging and, while it is governed 
by legal rules in some limited ways, this activity is largely the product 
of legal habit. Gifted practitioners know without reflection how to 
make accounts into legal narratives the way native speakers of a lan-
guage know how to express thoughts in grammatical sentences. But 
that does not mean that those who can do it know how to describe 
systematically what they have done. Those trained in the law learn to 
see the world in particular ways, and the particular ways come to be 
seen unproblematically as the only truth there is. There seems to be 
no question or choice about it. It just is. 
What are some of the assumptions involved in the construction of 
facts in legal stories? What legal habits lead some versions and some 
accounts to be favored over others? A complete answer to these ques-
tions cannot be given without a great deal more investigation and a 
great deal more evidence than I can present in a foreword, but, from 
what I have seen in my work on this subject thus far,48 I can suggest 
some candidates. 
A. Law and the Objectivist Theory of Truth 
Most people, when pressed, subscribe to what might be called the 
objectivist theory of truth. The objectivist theory of truth holds that 
there is a single neutral description of each event which has a privi-
47. 384 U.S. at 754 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
48. Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990 (forth· 
coming); see also K.L. SCHEPPELE, supra note 22; Scheppele, supra note 30. 
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leged position over all other accounts. This single, neutral description 
is privileged because it is objective, and it is objective because it is not 
skewed by any particular point of view. Its very "point-of-viewless-
ness"49 gives it its power. 
For example, in the Rusk case, the point-of-viewless answer to the 
question of whether Pat was choked or caressed might involve an ac-
count of the degree of force actually applied to Pat's neck as it might 
be seen by a neutral observer. Choking as an activity is associated 
with force;50 caressing as an activity is not.51 So the presence of force 
would allow the neutral observer to determine which description is 
most appropriate. If there is no actual observer to the event in ques-
tion, other trace evidence can substitute. Were there bruises? Did 
Pat's neck show the marks that Rusk would have made if he had really 
choked her? To tell caressing from choking, an objectivist account 
would focus on those observable differences that would allow someone 
not involved in the event to tell whether force has been applied. What 
Rusk thought he was doing or what Pat felt he was doing would be 
details outside the point-of-viewless account. 
Or, on the other example, the point-of-viewless answer to the ques-
tion of whether Davis had been questioned "most all the time during 
the day and most all the time during the night" would involve investi-
gating the clock times that Davis was asked questions by the detec-
tives. If Davis were never interrogated after 11:00 P.M. or before 7:00 
A.M., then "most all the time during the night" would not be a good 
description of his meetings with the detectives. And if he were only 
interrogated twice per day for an hour each time by the detectives, 
then "most all the time during the day" would not be such a good 
description either. What the experience felt like to Davis or to the 
detectives would be irrelevant to the point-of-viewless account. 
If one task of the law is to find truth52 then, on the objectivist 
account, the task of the law is to locate this privileged description, the 
one that enables the audience to tell what really happened as opposed 
49. The term is Catharine MacKinnon's. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, 
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638-39 (1983). 
50. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "choke" as "[t]o suffocate by external compres-
sion of the throat; to throttle, strangle." 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 154 (2d ed. 1989). 
51. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "caress" as "to treat affectionately or blandish-
ingly; to touch, stroke or pat endearingly." 2 Id. at 897. 
52. Though finding truth is not the only goal oflegal procedures, it certainly is one important 
consideration in assessing the adequacy of legal practice. If truth were the only goal, it would be 
quite difficult to make sense of the privilege against self-incrimination and many rules of evidence 
that exclude from a courtroom information that those outside the courtroom would take to be 
important and relevant in determining what happened. See Nessen, The Evidence or the Event? 
On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985). 
2090 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2073 
to what those involved thought happened. Truth can be found by re-
moving the self-serving accounts of those who stand to gain in the 
process of being partial. Truth, in this view, is what remains when all 
the bias, all the partiality, all the "point-of-viewness" is taken out and 
one is left with an objective account free of the special claims of those 
who stand to gain. And though legal advocates may emphasize partial 
versions, 53 judges or juries are thought to be able to sort through those 
partial accounts to find the bits that are "really true."54 
But how does one know truth when one finds it? Truth isn't a 
property of an event itself; truth is a property of an account of the 
event. As such, it has to be perceived and processed by someone, or 
else it couldn't be framed in language to count as an account at all. 
On the objectivist view, the potential "someones" who might observe 
and report are interchangeable; as long as they approach the task of 
description in the proper spirit, the description does not depend on 
who the observers are. But, as Nelson Goodman remarks, the case 
against "perception without conceptualization, the pure given, abso-
lute immediacy, the innocent eye, substance as substratum, has been 
so fully and frequently set forth ... as to need no restatement here."55 
Observers, even those not directly involved in a dispute, bring with 
them a conceptual scheme already formed, a set of presuppositions 
and expectations, that influences what they see and report. Getting a 
group of observers to come up with the same description simply shows 
that one has found a group that shared the same conceptual scheme at 
the start and followed the same instructions for observation. The 
"neutral observer's" point of view is no less a point of view than any 
other. It may be more widely shared in a social setting than other 
perceptions, and it may be systematically different from the percep-
53. The job of a lawyer is to re-present her client's views in such a way that the client's 
"story" comes across as compelling to a judge or to a jury. See Clark Cunningham's article in 
this issue for a perceptive discussion of the limits of re-presentation. An advocate knows that her 
job isn't to present "the truth," but rather to present her client's version in the best possible light 
without actually lying. Jerome Frank saw this process as evidence that courts were really inter-
ested not in finding truth, but rather in judging competing stories. See J. FRANK, The "Fight" 
Theory Versus the "Truth" Theory, in COURTS ON TRIAL 80 (1949). Still, when asked about 
truth, I suspect that most advocates would say that there is one truth to the matter at issue and 
that it can be found by removing "bias." 
54. Each side's presentation of the most helpful version of a story is not the only thing that 
makes it difficult for courts to get at a point-of-viewless description. Many bits of information 
that may be helpful in determining the truth may be excluded from legal description because they 
are not legally relevant or because they are not allowed to be considered for other reasons. We 
can see examples of the exclusion of informative but legally irrelevant information in this issue in 
the Articles by Milner Ball, David Luban, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams. 
55. N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 6 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
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tions of those immediately involved, but it is not point-of-viewless.56 
If the objectivist view is not point-of-viewless, then is the account it 
privileges still worth the reverence the law accords it? A great deal 
depends on just what the observer's point of view includes and ex-
cludes and what consequences such a view has. If the objectivist ac-
count is one point of view among many (and not point-of-viewless as 
against other point-of-viewful accounts), then one needs some other 
account explaining why it should be privileged, if indeed it is to be. 
One might begin such an account by saying that the objectivist view 
includes those things that should be included and excludes those 
things that should have no bearing on the legal outcome. And here is 
where the fate of the stories of outsiders might be considered relevant 
to a discussion of the point of view the law should take. If objectivist 
accounts systematically leave out the stories of outsiders and those sto-
ries should be considered, then perhaps objectivist accounts should not 
be privileged. 
What do our two objectivist accounts leave out in Rusk and in 
Davis? In Rusk, looking for the degree of physical force already 
makes important and controversial assumptions. For one thing, it as-
sumes that intentional accounts are irrelevant. Looking at objective 
force in this situation drops out both Pat's understanding of what it 
felt like to her and Rusk's account of what he might have intended. 
Doctrinally, this is a very curious thing to do in a criminal case. And 
then there is the question: Force, as seen by whom? Rusk may have 
intended to caress Pat; Pat may have felt choked. He may not have 
seen force in what happened between them, while she did. Men and 
women with systematically different experiences of force perceive 
where force begins very differently. Women see force as starting much 
earlier than men do, before it turns to physical and observable vio-
lence. 57 And any apparently objective standard of force cannot be 
neutral as between these two very different accounts. 58 
In Davis, watching the clock also misses some crucial information. 
56. Perhaps the best defense of this general position is W. JAMES, Pragmatism's Conception 
of Troth, in PRAGMATISM AND THE MEANING OF TRUTH 95 (1978). 
57. See S. EsTRICH, supra note 38, at 58-71. 
58. There is a further important question here, which has to do with the reliability of the 
perceptions of those involved. Suppose the rapist were a man who didn't know his own strength. 
He may not have realized just how much force he was applying in the course of what he saw as 
ordinary lovemaking when he almost killed his partner. Or suppose the victim were a woman 
who was particularly frightened of physical contact. Any touching would then be perceived as 
threatening. My suspicion is that the recurring drive toward objective standards comes from the 
worry that the disputants' perceptions cannot be trusted or that they may very well be seriously 
unrealistic. But I am trying to show here that there is also danger in objective standards, for they 
drop out important experiential information which cannot be observed. 
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If Davis felt that the detectives were frequently interrogating him in 
the day and at night (and he was supported in this because the ques-
tioning occurred when it was light and when it was dark), then consid-
ering only clock times would miss this crucial aspect of Davis' 
experience. Davis, after all, was not likely to see his situation the same 
way that the detectives saw it. For one thing, Davis was black and 
living in a state with a history and practice of severe and overt racism. 
Being questioned by the hostile white police59 was a serious business 
and knowing he was being held in connection with the rape and mur-
der of a white woman, when the likely result of being found guilty was 
execution, made his situation all the more dire. 60 He didn't know how 
long he was going to be held and questioned, questioned, questioned. 
He was frightened and didn't see any way out. 61 
Rusk and Davis, however, are unusual cases. In each, the outsiders 
(a woman in an acquaintance-rape case, 62 a black defendant in a racist 
climate) did in fact find that their views won out in the end. Rusk's 
conviction was upheld on appeal. Davis' confession was found to be 
coerced. This is not what one would expect if the objectivist accounts 
held sway, where actual force and clock time worked to undermine the 
outsiders' stories; nor is it what one would expect from the discussion 
above about the general exclusion of outsiders' perspectives from the 
law. What is going on here? 
In each of these cases, the outsiders' stories were persuasive be-
cause other forces managed to overcome the general legal habit of us-
ing objectivist accounts. And what were these other forces? For one 
thing, doctrine worked to the advantage of both outsiders here. In the 
rape case, one part of the relevant legal standard was whether the wo-
59. In the brief submitted by North Carolina to the Supreme Court, the state did not even try 
to deny the language the police used in dealing with Davis. "Surely, Davis was not such a 
sensitive person, after all his years in prison, that 'cussing' and being called 'Nigger' constituted 
any degree of fear or coercion." Brief for Respondent, at 8, Davis v. North Carolfna, 384 U.S. 
737 (1966) (No. 65-815). 
60. The execution rate in North Carolina for those indicted on first-degree murder charges 
around the time of Davis' case was 43% for black defendants charged with killing white victims 
and 15% for white defendants charged with killing white victims, with the differences being even 
greater in comparison on crimes different from the one Davis was charged with. S. GROSS & R. 
MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES JN CAPITAL SENTENCING 28 n.8 
(1989). In addition, nearly 90% of those executed for rape between 1930 and 1979 were black. 
Id. at 27 n.4. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) for the evidence that the Supreme 
Court found persuasive on the racism implicit in the administration of existing death penalty 
statutes. 
61. In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Davis said, "I signed that paper [the confes-
sion] to get away from [those] people over there because I was scared of them." Habeas Tran-
script, supra note 42, at 252. 
62. For a picture of the difficulty women have in getting rapes successfully prosecuted, see 
Scheppele, supra note 30, at 1096-99. 
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man was "so terrified by threats as to overpower her will to resist. " 63 
This put the focus on the woman's feeling of terror, and made her 
account relevant to judging whether the legal standard was met. In 
the confessions case, the issue was whether the confession was made 
voluntarily. This, also, involved considering the situation from the de-
fendant's point of view. 64 Both fear and voluntariness pose challenges 
for an objectivist account; both raise questions of whether what might 
look like consent was what was felt as consent. Though one can tell a 
great deal about people's feelings from observing their actions, not all 
feelings show themselves clearly. And so, when the doctrinal require-
ments direct the attention of judges and juries to the point of view of 
the outsiders in these cases, it matters when outsiders say that the feel-
ings do not match the observations. 
But that was not all that was going on here. Doctrine might have 
allowed the results, but it did not compel them. A black man whose 
case arrived at the Supreme Court in 1966 and a woman whose case 
arrived in the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1981 had social forces 
working for them also. The Civil Rights Movement had by 1966 
achieved substantial success in calling attention to the racially discrim-
inatory practices of southern police departments. 65 Federal judges 
were clearly on notice that the treatment of blacks in southern crimi-
nal cases was appalling, and that federal, constitutional remedies were 
needed to keep state courts in check. This certainly did not mean that 
federal courts always supported the cause of the Civil Rights Move-
ment. 66 But it may have made it easier for the Supreme Court, in 
some circumstances at least, to hear and respond to the voices of 
blacks. Similarly, the Women's Movement had by 1981 succeeded in 
putting rape reform on the agendas of most state legislatures and had 
achieved reform of the laws in many states. 67 And though this cer-
tainly did not by any means signal automatic victory for the forces of 
feminism, it may have once again allowed courts to hear and respond 
to the voices of women. 68 
But two individual cases like this do not a general practice make. 
63. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469-70, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1959). 
64. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966). 
65. A. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2 (1984). 
66. See generally Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2152 (1989). 
67. S. EsTRICH, supra note 38, at 80. 
68. The reform of rape laws did not automatically lead to women's points of view being 
adopted, even when the states shifted from focusing on her consent to focusing on his force. In 
fact, the evidence shows many courts went on seeing their cases the same way. See Scheppele, 
supra note 30, at 1102-04 (diagnosing the problem), 1108-13 (discussing the cause). 
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It is hard for institutions to change old habits. And the vigorous dis-
sents that both of these cases produced (as well as the fact that each 
high court overturned at least one other court below) testify to the 
controversial, transient nature of the solutions found and the perspec-
tives adopted. 
I raise these two cases to show that the objectivist theory of truth, 
however powerful a hold it may have on legal reasoning, is not all the 
law recognizes, even now. There are places where the stories of out-
siders can break through the objectivist barricades. But these two 
cases show, too, just how much it takes to get an outsider's view to 
provide the winning account. In each case, doctrine directing courts 
to pay attention to particular points of view combined with massive 
social movements making more real those points of view at a social 
level produced some small victories, over vigorous, angry, and nearly 
successful dissents. 
B. The Boundaries of Legal Narrative 
When does a story begin? At the beginning, one might plausibly 
answer. But one of the important characteristics of stories is that they 
have no natural beginning, in the sense of having only one particular 
place and time at which the story can begin. 69 Stories can always be 
constructed differently, though many are told in situations where there 
are such powerful background assumptions that a particular version 
seems to be the only version. This is just as true of legal stories as it is 
of any other sort of story. But in legal stories, "where one begins" has 
a substantial effect because it influences just how the story pulls in the 
direction of a legal outcome. "Where one begins" also has a great deal 
to do with the sympathy given the stories of outsiders. Where one 
ends the story also makes a similar difference. The boundaries of legal 
narrative are not fixed, but in many cases they might as well be. Those 
who are experienced legal storytellers often do not perceive themselves 
as having a choice; they just work with what is "obviously" the way to 
tell this particular story. The boundaries oflegal narratives are shaped 
powerfully by legal habit, a habit that has worked to the disadvantage 
of outsiders. 
The traditional legal strategy of story-beginning looks to when 
"the trouble" began, and fans out in the direction of legally relevant 
69. This case is made very effectively in A. DANTO, NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE (1985). 
For an excellent analysis in the legal literature, see Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). 
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facts. 70 "The trouble" is that the set of events giving rise to the lawsuit 
and the legal statement of facts usually focuses narrowly on what 
made those events happen. So, for example, in Rusk, the standard 
legal storytelling strategy would direct attention to the events on the 
night Pat claimed she was raped. The beginning would be set at the 
time and place that she and Rusk first met. And details of the events 
occurring between them from that beginning point until they parted 
company later that evening would provide the boundaries of the legal 
story. Similarly, in Davis, judging the voluntariness of the confession 
would require beginning the story at the time of Davis' arrest and de-
tention by the Charlotte police and would end when he confessed. 
The beginning seems obvious. As does the end. 
But of course, these are not the only possible boundaries. In Rusk, 
the account given in the intermediate appeals court majority opinion 
started predictably with the setting in which Pat met Rusk. 71 But 
Judge Wilner, dissenting in that court and voting to uphold the rape 
conviction, began his narrative somewhere else, with the judicial 
equivalent of a wide-angle opening shot of the larger terrain on which 
this individual rape occurred. He noted that rape attacks were on the 
rise, that most victims responded with verbal rather than physical 
resistance, and that law enforcement agencies throughout the country 
warned women not to fight back against their attackers. 72 Against this 
background, Pat's actions in not physically struggling looked very dif-
ferent than they did in an account starting with when "the trouble" 
began that night. 
In Davis, too, the story in the lower courts upholding Davis' con-
viction fixed the narrative boundaries with the rape/murder at the be-
ginning and the confession at the end, some with flashbacks to the 
point where he had escaped from prison right before the crime in ques-
tion occurred.73 But the story did not have to begin this way. Work-
ing from the same record, Chief Justice Earl Warren began his 
account of the Davis case like this: 
Elmer Davis is an impoverished Negro with a third or fourth grade edu-
cation. His level of intelligence is such that it prompted the comment by 
the court below, even while deciding against him on his claim ofinvolun-
70. This "reactive lawyering" paradigm is well described in B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCT-
ING AMERICAN LAW 46-71 (1984). 
71. Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624, 625 (1979). 
72. 406 A.2d at 635 (Wilner, dissenting). 
73. Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770, 773-78 (4th Cir. 1964); Davis v. North Carolina, 
310 F.2d 904, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1962); Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494, 495-98 
(E.D.N.C. 1963); Davis v. North Carolina, 196 F. Supp. 488, 491-93 (E.D.N.C. 1961); State v. 
Davis, 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365, 366-69 (1960). 
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tariness, that there is a moral question whether a person of Davis' 
mentality should be executed. Police first came in contact with Davis 
while he was a child when his mother murdered his father, and thereaf-
ter knew him through his long criminal record, beginning with a prison 
term he served at the age of 15 or 16. 74 
In each of these cases, the wide-angle beginning puts the event 
before the court in a broader context than legal narratives usually in-
voke. And it is not surprising that in each of these "wide-angle" ver-
sions, the stories of outsiders are given more sympathy than they are 
given in versions beginning with an account of "the trouble." 
Why is this? Outsiders often have a different history, a different set 
of background experiences and a different set of understandings than 
insiders. (And just as all insiders' experiences are not all alike, neither 
are outsiders' experiences all of a piece.) So, when taken out of their 
context, outsiders' actions often look bizarre, strange, and not what 
the insider listening to the story would do under similar circum-
stances. And without knowing more about how the situation fits into 
a context other than the "obvious," insider's one, courts may find it 
hard to rule for outsiders. In the rape case, Pat didn't struggle to get 
away. It is probably hard for most men (who, after all, tend to be the 
judges) to imagine not fighting back when attacked unless their passiv-
ity results from a weakness of will or a failure of nerve, neither of 
which are remediable in law. But the beginning of Judge Wilner's nar-
rative showing that most women do not physically struggle when at-
tacked, and that women are advised not to struggle by police, provides 
a context within which Pat's actions may be understood by those who 
have not shared her background and experiences. Similarly, Chief 
Justice Warren's account succeeds in showing that Davis was at a 
great disadvantage in dealing with the police, allowing Warren to 
break through the usual assumptions that the relevant standard to ap-
ply was what the judge or juror (or the "reasonable man") would have 
done under the circumstances. Davis became a real person with a dis-
tinctive past, and not some person on average or the law's vision of the 
typical rational actor. Warren might have been able to be even more 
effective in providing a wide-angle view helpful to outsiders had he 
documented the racism that existed in the North Carolina legal system 
at the time and the well-founded fear Davis had. Warren's perspective 
may not have provided a wide-enough angle since it only involved this 
particular case and not the structural conditions giving rise to the dif-
ferential treatment of blacks and whites in many similar cases. 
Now wide-angle descriptions may not always, or even frequently, 
74. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966). 
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work to the advantage of outsiders. 75 But these examples show us how 
they might work in some circumstances. The claims of outsiders are 
often not heard in law because the experiences and reactions and be-
liefs and values that outsiders bring to the law are not easily processed 
in the traditional structures of legal narratives. Drawing the bounda-
ries of legal stories closely around the particular event at issue may 
exclude much of the evidence that outsiders may find necessary to ex-
plain their points of view. But standards of legal relevance, appearing 
to limit the gathering of evidence neutrally to just "what happened" at 
the time of "the trouble," may have the effect of excluding the key 
materials of outsiders' stories. And this apparently harmless legal 
habit has effects that are not at all harmless. 
IV. RETHINKING LEGAL NARRATIVES 
I have tried to show in this foreword how the "we/they" structures 
of legal discourse have led to the exclusion of outsiders' stories. And I 
have further argued that some apparently neutral legal habits, such as 
preferring objectivist accounts to other point-of-viewful accounts of 
events and framing stories narrowly around "the trouble" at issue, 
work to silence the accounts of outsiders (though sometimes doctrine 
may aid them). But what can be done from here? 
In rethinking legal narratives, the first step is to realize that the 
presence of different versions of a story does not automatically mean 
that someone is lying and that a deviant version needs to be discred-
ited. Stories can be told many ways, and even stories that lead to very 
different legal conclusions can be different plausible and accurate ver-
sions of the same event. It may make sense, then, to think that the 
presence of these different, competing versions of a story is itself an 
important feature of the dispute at hand that courts are being called 
upon to resolve. 
In some cases, different participants come to see "what happened" 
differently. Rather than choosing one point of view over another, 
courts might recognize that the existence of multiple, self-believed, 
plausible accounts is an important fact of the case that deserves some 
attention. If a dispute occurs across a perceptual fault line where peo-
ple with different backgrounds, understandings and expectations have 
a disagreement, then the presence of different versions is a clue that 
there is more at stake here than the violation of a particular legal rule. 
75. One of the chief effects of the law-and-economics movement has been to expand the scope 
of legal description. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 70, at 53, for a discussion of these effects. 
The law-and-economics movement has not generally been associated with the claims of people of 
color, of women, or of other outsiders. · 
2098 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:2073 
Whole world views may have come into collision and it does not serve 
courts well to simply suppress one of them. 76 
Courts can exacerbate and reinforce the differences and disagree-
ments that invariably exist in a pluralistic society by clinging to the 
views that there is only one true version of a story and that there is 
only one right way to tell it. Listening to the stories of outsiders does 
even more than provide a necessary corrective to monolithic and dom-
ineering majority stories; it also provides a way for courts to build into 
the structure of legal reasoning the pluralism that it is the business of 
the courts to protect and the respect for persons that it is the business 
of the courts to enforce. 
76. For a similar argument, see G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE 
LAW 87-114 (1985). 
